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Abstract 
 
This study assesses government mechanisms in the fight against terrorism with particular 
emphasis on the bundling and unbundling of ten governance dynamics. The empirical 
evidence is based on a panel of 53 African countries for period 1998-2012 and Generalized 
Method of Moments. The following findings are established. First, for the most part, political 
governance and its constituents respectively have negative effects on all terrorism dynamics, 
with the following consistent increasing order of negative magnitude: unclear terrorism, 
transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism and total terrorism. Second, overwhelmingly for 
economic and institutional governances, the governance dynamics and their constituent 
components affect terrorism negatively, with the magnitude on domestic terrorism 
consistently higher than that on transnational terrorism. Third, for most specifications, the 
effect of general governance is consistently negative on terrorism variables.  
 Theoretical and practical policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 There are four main reasons for positioning an inquiry on the bundling and unbundling 
of institutions1 in the fight against terrorism in Africa, notably: (i) growth trends in terrorism 
on the continent; (ii) debates on the effect of governance on terrorism; (iii) advances in the 
measurement of institutions and paradigm shifts in the conception of governance and (iv) gaps 
in the literature. 
First, terrorism-related trauma is an increasing problem in Africa (Alfa-Wali et al. 
2015). Whereas the phenomenon of terrorism is not new on the continent, its increasing trend 
has become a significant policy concern. Africa is offering a fertile grown for terrorism as a 
result of inter alia: extremist ideologies of groups lobbying to dismantle old states and 
establish new ones; continued political and regional instability; ethnic and tribal tensions and 
religious fundamentalism (Fazel 2013). This narrative is substantiated by Clavarino (2014) 
who posits that whereas the world is focusing on the Middle East, Africa is another part of the 
world where Islamic extremism is burgeoning and becoming radicalized. Notable examples of 
such groups that have increased their magnitude and sphere of activities include: the Boko 
Haram in Nigeria; al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Shabab in Somalia. 
 Second, whether good governance reduces or promotes terrorism is the subject of 
debate in the literature (Lee 2013). There is a strand which posits that fundamental features of 
good governance like, civil society, democratic political systems, political participation and 
knowledge economy, can reduce resentment toward the State and hence, mitigate the 
likelihood of terrorist organizations recruiting extremists (Li 2005; Windsor 2003). On the 
contrary, another strand argues that good governance may not be useful in mitigating 
terrorism because the interests of terrorists’ organizations are not represented in government 
institutions of democratic politics (Gause 2005). This contending strand is supported by Ross 
(1993) who is of the perspective that, terrorism can sprout in societies endowed with 
comparatively good institutions because there are a plethora of factors in nations enjoying 
good government quality that indirectly or directly build on grievances as well as conducive 
conditions for terrorist activities. These include, inter alia: freedom of speech to express 
disagreement and dissatisfaction, access and freedom to the media and civil liberties.  This 
second strand is consistent with evolving narratives substantiating that the sympathy for and 
adherence to terrorist organisations is fundamentally motivated by exclusive socio-economic 
                                                 
1
 Governance and institutions are used interchangeably throughout the study.  The latter concept is quite distinct 
from “institutional governance” which is represented by corruption-control and the rule of law (see Asongu 
2016a). 
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development in countries with comparatively good governance standards (see Bass 2014). For 
instance, Western-born and -educated youths are joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant 
(ISIL) principally because they feel excluded by governance structures in Western nations 
(Foster 2014). 
 Third, there have been some interesting advances in the measurement of institutions 
and paradigm shifts in the conception of governance. This essentially builds on priorities of 
the two contemporary dominant models of development. Whereas the Washington Consensus 
prioritizes political governance, the Beijing Model places more emphasis on economic 
governance (Asongu 2016a). Within this framework, there is an evolving stream of literature 
sympathetic to the perspective that short-term governance priorities are needed to resolve 
Africa’s poverty tragedy (Asongu and Ssozi, 2016; Asongu 2016b). Beyond this narrative on 
paradigm shifts, some indicators of good governance cannot be effectively measured without 
some employment of preliminary techniques to bundle governance variables into composite 
indicators. For instance, in the light of the debate between the Washington Consensus and the 
Beijing Model, it is difficult to appreciate political (economic) governance without deriving a 
composite indicator for political stability and “voice and accountability” (regulation quality 
and government effectiveness).  
The paradigm shift has led to an evolving stream of literature on the bundling and 
unbundling of institutions for development outcomes in Africa, notably: the role of formal 
institutions in knowledge economy (Andrés et al. 2015);  predicting the Arab Spring based on 
negative governance signals (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016a); most effective governance 
channels in the fight against software piracy (Andrés  and Asongu, 2013) and conflicts/crimes 
(Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2016) or in the stimulation of innovation (Oluwatobi et al. 2015). 
In the light of these insights, the bundling and unbundling of governance addresses concerns 
of conceptual conflation in the usage of governance indicators. Hence, we aim to provide 
empirical validity for the usage of terms like political governance, economic governance, 
institutional governance and general governance in the connection between governance and 
terrorism.  
Fourth, the available literature on channels by which terrorism and conflicts can be 
curbed has focused on the following mechanisms: educational tools (Brockhoff et al. 2014), 
like   bilingualism  (Costa et al. 2008); military dimensions (Feridun and Shahbaz 2010); 
publicity and press freedom (Hoffman et al. 2013); transparency (Bell et al. 2014) and 
assessment of terrorism behaviour (Gardner 2007). African-specific literature has focused on 
understanding: geopolitical fluctuations (Straus 2012); poverty and lack of politico-economic 
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freedom (Barros et al. 2008); competition in military companies in the swift termination of 
conflicts (Akcinaroglu  and Radziszewski  2013); the role of global warming (Price and Elu 
2016) and exploratory studies on the African Union’s role in fighting terrorism (Ewi and 
Aning 2006). Moreover, the literature on the role of governance on terrorism has either been 
skewed on the effect of democracy for the most part (see Lee 2013; Savun and Phillips 2009) 
or oriented toward a few specific dimensions like the rule of law (Choi 2010) and 
transparency (Bell et al. 2014). Unfortunately, democracy (rule of law) is only an aspect of 
political (institutional) governance.  
The present study contributes to the literature by assessing government mechanisms in 
the fight against terrorism with particular emphasis on the bundling and unbundling of 
governance dynamics. Thus, the inquiry complements the existing literature on the role of 
governance in fighting terrorism by articulating the conception, definition and measurement 
of governance variables. For instance, the concept of governance has been used in the 
literature without a measurement that is all-inclusive (Nangila 2016).  A case in point is 
Kangoye (2013) who has employed “corruption-control” as “general governance”. Moreover, 
the concepts of economic governance, institutional governance and political governance have 
been used in the literature without statistical validity (Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 2017b; Kurtz 
and Schrank 2007a, 2017b). It is argued in this study that is not appropriate to use the term 
“political governance” unless it encompasses “voice and accountability” and “political 
stability/no violence”.  
 Adopted governance indicators include: political governance (political stability/no 
violence and voice & accountability); economic governance (government effectiveness and 
regulation quality); institutional governance (corruption-control and the rule of law) and 
general governance. The interest of bundling and unbundling institutions derives from recent 
evidence that the distinction as well as simultaneous consideration of governance indicators 
provide more room for more policy implications (see Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016b).   
In addition to improving the consistency between the use of governance concepts and 
their empirical validity, because “applied econometrics” is also meant to confirm/reject 
existing theories and empirical trends in the literature, this study also aims to confirm findings 
from existing literature within the specific context of Africa2.  
The remainder of the study is structrued as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical 
underpinnings, clarifies governance concepts and presents graphical insights. The data and 
                                                 
2
 In the sentence, “applied econometrics” does not refer to a specific journal, but rather to the used of 
econometrics to accept or reject existing theoretical underpinnings and empirical trends.   
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methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes with implications.  
 
2. Clarification of governance and theoretical underpinnings  
2.1 Clarification of governance  
 
 This section clarifies the concept of governance used in the study. It is engaged in two 
main strands: definitions of governance and debates surrounding adopted measurements of 
governance.  
 According to Asongu (2016a), governance is a multidimensional and complex 
phenomenon to which many definitions have been attributed. First, Dixit (2009 p.5) has 
defined economic governance as  ‘…structure and functioning of the legal and social 
institutions that support economic activity and economic transactions by protecting property 
rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to provide physical and 
organizational infrastructure’3. Second, in accordance with Tusalem (2015), governance 
consists of: political stability, regulation quality, rule of law, corruption-control and 
bureaucratic effectiveness. Third, from the perspective of Fukuyama (2013), the governance 
concept can be more comprehensively understood if it embodies four main factors: output 
measures, procedural measures, bureaucratic measures and indicators of capacity that consists 
of both resources and professionalism. Fourth, as far as we have reviewed, the definition, 
conception and measurement of governance by Kaufmann et al. (2010) are the most employed 
in the literature. These consist of three main governance types: political, economic and 
institutional governances. (i) Political governance is defined as the election and replacement 
of political leaders. It is measured with two indicators: political stability/no violence and 
“voice and accountability”. (ii) Economic governance is defined as the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. It is also measured with two 
indicators: regulation quality and government effectiveness. (iii) Institutional governance is 
defined as the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between 
them. It is measured with two variables: corruption-control and the rule of law.  
 In spite of the wide acceptance enjoyed by the Kaufmann et al. (2010) indicators in the 
literature, several criticisms on the quality of underlying indicators have emerged from 
scholarly circles. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi have also been promptly responding to the 
corresponding criticisms in order to maintain the confidence enjoyed by their variables. As far 
                                                 
3
 Emphasis on original.  
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as we have reviewed, one of the most interesting debates has been a stream of rebuttals to 
criticisms from two notable academics: Andrew Schrank and Marcus Kurtz. For brevity and 
lack of space, the interested reader can find the main strands of the debate in: “models, 
measures and mechanisms” (Kurtz and Schrank 2007a); a reply (Kaufmann et al. 2007a); a 
defense (Kurtz and Schrank 2007b) and a rejoinder (Kaufmann et al. 2007b).   
   
2.2 Theoretical underpinnings  
We briefly discuss stylized facts motivating the linkage between governance and 
terrorism in Africa. Terrorism within the framework of this study is consistent with Enders 
and Sandler (2006) and is understood as the actual and threatened use of force by sub-
nationals actors for the goal of using intimidation to secure political goals. As recently 
documented by Clavarino (2014), bad governance on the continent is substantially 
contributing to fertilizing the ground for the flourishing of extremism and terrorism. 
According to the narrative, terrorists groups in Africa are mushrooming essentially because 
Islamists on the continent can easily take advantage of certain weaknesses in governance, 
notably: corrupt and vulnerable central governments, underequipped and undertrained armies, 
porous borders, and booming drugs trade that is used to finance terrorism. The author further 
maintains that Islamic militancy has increased in the Sahel region for the most part because of 
the political instability and absence of the rule of law, following the 2011 collapse of the 
regime of Muammar Gaddafi. The recent French intervention in Mali has dispersed Islamic 
militants across the continent. Elsewhere in Africa, Islamist militancy is increasing because of 
poor governance. The Boko Haram influence in West Africa is predominantly in areas where 
the presence of government is not strong,  Al-Shabaab has prospered in East Africa essentially 
because Somalia has been a failed state for decades while Islamic terrorists groups in North 
Africa   have strongholds in areas with weak government influence. These movements 
include: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Qaeda-linked Mulathameen Brigade 
led by the Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar; Ansar Al-Shariya in Tunisia and Ansar Dine, led by 
a former close ally of Gaddafi, Iyad Ag Ghaly.  
 The theoretical underpinnings can be discussed in three main strands:  nexuses 
between governance and domestic terrorism; the relationship between governance and 
transnational terrorism and debates on the nexus between terrorism and governance. 
Consistent with Choi (2010), governance is linked to domestic terrorism in the perspective 
that ordinary citizens are endowed with incentives to employ political violence against 
institutions (or the government), political figures and other citizens under three scenarios, 
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namely, when they: (i) hold grievances; (ii) find no peaceful means to settling grievances, 
increasing sentiments of desperation and hopelessness and (iii) perceive the use of  terrorism 
as a viable and legitimate action of last resort with which to communicate their frustration and 
anger. The underpinning of this logic is that in so far as ordinary citizens have access to 
peaceful channels of resolving conflicts, they are not very likely to contemplate terrorism 
options as practical means to settling disputes. Within this framework, we postulate that 
countries which promote good governance offer a peaceful environment for the settlement of 
conflicts. In other words, an atmosphere of good governance is not very conducive for 
domestic terrorism because citizens with grievances have peaceful options to making their 
voices heard.  
 In the second strand, governance is also linked to transnational terrorism in the view 
that good governance consolidates the legitimacy of a political system by providing a 
protective shield to both foreigners and citizens on the one hand, as well as nonviolent 
mechanisms to dispute resolution on the other hand (Choi 2010). Hence, in the light of 
governance definitions we have clarified above, terrorism is very likely to be limited by, inter 
alia: (i) a free and fair democratic procedure for the election and replacement of political 
leaders (political governance); (ii) the formulation and implementation of conducive policies 
that deliver public commodities to citizens (economic governance) and (iii) sound respect by 
the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them (institutional 
governance).  
 The third strand focuses on various theoretical debates surrounding the relationship 
between governance and terrorism. According to Hoffman et al. (2013), studies on the nexus 
between governance and cross-national terrorism build on scholarship articulating regime-
based disparities in opportunities for violence. Unlike bad governance characterized by 
autocracies, democracies provide citizens with liberties of politico-economic engagements 
without much government interference. Whereas good governance offers a plethora of 
benefits that are tied to freedom, it also offers substantial avenues of mischief. In effect, 
unlike stable autocracies, democracies could be more likely targeted by terrorists 
organizations because good governance institutions may do very little to curtail violence ex-
ante. Emphasis is laid on stable autocracies because terrorism cannot be controlled by failing 
and failed states (Lai 2007; Piazza 2008a). This narrative is in accordance with Schmid 
(1992); Eubank and Weinberg (1994); Drakos and Gofas (2006) and Piazza (2007). On the 
contrary, theories of political access (Eyerman 1998) posit that good governance and strong 
democracies should be comparatively more immune to terrorism relative to non-democracies. 
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Governance features that contribute to this edge in democracies include: independence of 
judiciaries (Findley and Young 2011); respect of the rule of law (Choi 2010) and effective 
management of conflicts. It follows that good governance institutions could also provide an 
enabling environment for aggrieved citizens to support or resort to terrorism as means to 
conflict resolution (Li 2005).  
 From an empirical perspective, many studies have documented (Lee 2013) and 
established the positive nexus between democracy and transnational terrorism (Eubank and 
Weinberg 1994, 2001; Piazza 2007, 2008b; Weinberg and Eubank 1998). Chenoweth (2010) 
has argued that good governance with democratic competition can stimulate terrorist 
organisations to resort to violence. Therefore, a positive nexus between political competition 
and terrorism can be expected.  According to Li (2005), there are two competing effects from 
democracy. On the one hand, government constraints can boost transnational terrorism 
because of political deadlock from checks and balances. On the other hand, democratic 
participation mitigates transnational terrorism incidents. Savun and Phillips (2009) have 
shown that compared to good governance characteristics such as democracy, there is a 
stronger link between terrorism and foreign connections.  
 Some emphasis on the findings of Savun and Phillips (2009) is necessary to further 
articulate the nexus between good governance and international terrorism. The authors have 
concluded that foreign policy behaviour (irrespective of regime type) is associated with 
transnational terrorism. In essence, countries that are very involved in international politics 
are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorism because their foreign policies are 
likely to create resentment abroad. It follows that nations with good governance 
characteristics such as democracy can still be targeted by transnational terrorist organisations 
due to their foreign policy and not because of their type of regime per se.  
 
2.3 Graphical insights  
  
 Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively show linkages between governance and 
domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism and unclear terrorism. A negative relationship is 
consistently apparent when the figures are observed horizontally and vertically. The negative 
relationships imply that good governance is associated with lower levels of terrorism and 
vice-versa.  An observation that is particularly striking is the relationship between political 
stability and terrorism. The corresponding curve which is consistently the steepest implies that 
political stability has the highest degree of sensitivity to terrorism. In the sections that follow, 
we substantiate these exploratory insights with empirical validity.  
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Figure 1: Domestic terrorism (Domter) and governance  
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Figure 2: Transnational terrorism (Transter) and governance  
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Figure 3: Unclear terrorism (Unter) and governance  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries for the period 1996-2012 with data from: 
(i) the Global Terrorism Database, (ii) African Development indicators (ADI) and World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank and (iii) terrorism incidents from Enders et 
al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012). The periodicity ends in the year 2012 because of 
constraints in data availability: (i) macroeconomic and institutional indicators from  ADI of 
the World Bank on the one hand and (ii) terrorism variables from Enders et al. (2011) and 
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Gailbulloev et al. (2012) on the other hand. The periodicity begins from 1996 because 
government quality variables from WGI are only available from the year.  
Given that the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique  is the 
adopted estimation strategy, we are confronted with three major constraints. First, a basic 
condition for the employment of the GMM approach is that the number of years in the time 
series (T) should be lower than the number of countries (N). Hence, the T<N condition is 
required. Second, a minimum of 5 periods is required for the employment of GMM. 
Therefore, T≥5. The study addresses the two constraints by narrowing the sample to the 
period 1998-2012 and employing 3 year data averages or non-overlapping intervals (NOI) 
such that the number of periods is equal to 5 year (T=5). The use of data averages is also 
motivated by the need to mitigate short-run or business cycle disturbances that may loom 
substantially (Islam 1995, p. 323).  Therefore we have five three-year NOI: 1998-2000; 2001-
2003; 2004-2006; 2007-2009 and 2010-2012.  
Four different but related terrorism dependent variables are employed: domestic, 
transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. The dependent variable records the 
number of yearly terrorism incidents a country experiences. In order to avoid mathematical 
issues of log-transforming zeros and correct for the positive skew in the data, we are 
consistent with the terrorism literature in taking the natural logarithm of terrorism incidents 
after adding one to the base (Choi and Salehyan 2013; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2014; Efobi and 
Asongu 2016; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016c).  
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives 
(Enders and Sandler, 2006). Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015 p. 6). 
Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals 
of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters 
are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is  “ terrorism including those 
acts of terrorism that concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, 
supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from 
another”.  Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can 
neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum 
of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms.  
The independent variables of interest are the ten unbundled and bundled governance 
variables:  corruption-control,  the rule of law,  government effectiveness, regulation quality, 
political stability, voice and accountability, general governance, institutional governance, 
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economic govenance and political governance.  Whereas the first-six are unbundled 
governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010), the last-four as bundled composite 
indicators by means of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique which is discussed 
in Section 3.2.1. The  first-six governance indicators are increasingly being employed in 
governance literature (see Gani, 2011; Andrés et al. 2015; Yerrabit and Hawkes 2015; Ajide 
and Raheem 2016).  
In order to ensure that estimated results are not biased by omitted variables, this study 
includes six control variables: internet penetration, inclusive development, economic growth 
(GDP growth), inflation, military expenditure and a lagged value of the dependent variable. 
First, the internet is being increasingly used by terrorists’ organisations like ISIL for 
propaganda, recruitment and coordination of terrorists’ attacks (Argomaniz 2015; Holbrook 
2015).  Second, socio-economic exclusion has been documented to increase sympathy for and 
adherence to terrorist organisations (Bass 2014). This is specifically the case with some 
Western-educated fighters joining ISIL (Foster 2014). Moreover, one of the root causes of the 
Boko Haram of Nigeria is the less developed northern Nigerian region when compared to the 
more prosperous Southern part of the country (Tonwe and Eke 2013). The inequality adjusted 
human development index (IHDI) is used to proxy for inclusive development (see Asongu et 
al. 2015b) because of data availability constraints in the Gini index of inequality.  
Third, economic growth is expected to decrease terrorism because it provides more 
financial resources with which to combat the phenomenon. This intuition is consistent with 
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) who have established that compared to high income countries 
which can easily absorb terrorism externalities without negative economic consequences, low 
income countries lack the financial resources to absorb underlying negative shocks. Fourth, 
chaotic inflation should intuitively be linked to political strife and violence because of inter 
alia: diminishing purchasing power and reducing domestic investment due to a negative 
economic outlook (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016a). The latter point builds on the established 
evidence that investors prefer ambiguity-safe investment strategies (Kelsey and Le Roux 
2017a, 2017b).  Internal conflicts ultimately increase the likelihood for terrorist activities 
(Asongu and Nwachukwu 2017). Fifth, from logic and common sense, growing military 
expenditure is very likely to be negatively associated with terrorism ex-ante of warfare. This 
intuition is substantiated by recent empirical literature (see  Feridun and  Shahbaz 2010). 
Sixth, we expect the absolute value of the lagged dependent variables to fall within the 
interval of zero and one. This is the information criterion for evidence of catch-up in 
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terrorism: countries with low levels of terrorism catching-up their counterparts with higher 
levels.  
For robustness check and/sensitivity analysis, another set of the conditioning 
information set is used. This new set of control variables consist of urbanization, population 
growth, openness/globalization and foreign aid that have been documented to affect terrorism 
(see  Bandyopadhyay  et al. 2014; Lutz and Lutz 2014, 2015). Whereas from intuition regions 
with high population densities (e.g. in urban areas) could more easily be targeted by terrorists, 
the effects of population growth and urbanization on terrorism are also contingent on the 
sophistication/modernisation of techniques used to trace, prevent and fight terrorism. While 
foreign aid has been documented to dampen terrorism (Bandyopadhyay  et al. 2014), the 
incidence of development assistance is also contingent on dynamics of foreign aid, inter alia: 
purpose of aid (e.g. military aid versus aid to the economic sector) and type of aid (bilateral 
versus multilateral aid) (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016c). In spite of the consensus in the 
literature that openness/globalization affects terrorism, the relevance of globalization is 
contingent on specific dimensions of openness (e.g. political, versus economic versus social) 
(see Lutz and Lutz 2014, 2015).   
 The definitions of variables are provided in Appendix 1, the summary statistics in 
Appendix 2 and the correlation matrix for initial (robustness check) regressions in Appendix 
3(4). The summary statistics shows that the variables are comparable. Moreover, based on 
corresponding variations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would 
emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate concerns about multicollinearity.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis  
 The study employs principal component analysis (PCA) for bundling governance 
variables (see Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016b). The PCA is a statistical technique that is used 
to reduce a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated indicators 
called principal components (PCs). The correlation matrix in Appendix 3 shows the high 
degree of substitution between governance variables. The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) 
criterion is used to retain common factors. The authors have suggested that only PCs with an 
eigenvalue greater than one or the mean should be retained. From Table 1, we notice that the 
first PC corresponding to general governance has an eigenvalue of 4.787.  Moreover the 
corresponding variation associated with the underlying PC is 79.7%, which implies that more 
than 79% of information in the six governance indicators is contained in the general 
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governance composite indicator (G.gov). The narrative on eigenvalues and total variability is 
consistent with the other composite indicators, notably: political governance (Polgov) has an 
eigenvalue of 1.647 with  more than 82% of information in the constituent indicators (political 
stability/no violence and voice & accountability); economic governance (Ecogov) has an 
eigenvalue of 1.863 with more than 93% of variability from constituent indicators 
(government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional governance (Instgov) 
displays an eigenvalue of 1.867 with approximately 94% of information contained in the rule 
of law and corruption-control.  Polgov (or political governance) is defined as the election and 
replacement of political leaders. Ecogov (or economic governance) is the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities. Instgov (or institutional 
governance) is the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions 
between them. The definitions are consistent with Kaufmann (2007a, 2007b, 2010) and recent 
governance literature on the bundling of institutions (Andrés et al. 2015; Asongu 2016a).  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.385 0.370 0.412 0.426 0.440 0.412 0.797 0.797 4.787 
Second  PC 0.093 0.850 -0.364 -0.343 0.007 -0.140 0.072 0.870 0.437 
Third PC 0.862 -0.179 0.122 -0.192 -0.182 -0.373 0.058 0.929 0.353 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.823 0.823 1.647 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.176 1.000 0.352 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.931 0.931 1.863 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.068 1.000 0.137 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.933 0.933 1.867 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.066 1.000 0.132 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
 It is important to devote some space to clarifying potential concerns that might result 
from using PC regressors. As far as we have reviewed, these concerns were first raised by 
Pagan (1984, p. 242). The author maintained that three principal concerns are associated with 
augmented regressors or second-stage variables derived from an initial regression, notably 
issues: about efficiency, consistency and inferential validity of estimations. Consistent with 
the narrative, whereas a two-step process results in consistent and efficient estimates, not all 
corresponding inferences are valid. The inferential concern broadly aligns with an abundant 
supply of literature devoted to articulating the same concern: (Oxley and McAleer 1993; 
McKenzie and McAleer 1997; Ba and Ng 2006; Westerlund and Urbain 2013a).  
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 Within the specific framework of PC-derived regressors, to the best of our knowledge, 
Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) have provided insights into tackling the issue. The 
authors have built on more contemporary literature (Stock and Watson 2002; Bai, 2003; 
Pesaran 2006; Bai 2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et al. 2012) to establish that normal inferences 
are possible with PC regressors in so far as the estimated coefficients converge to  their real 
values at the rate of rate  NT  , where N (T) is the number of cross-sections (time series). 
Whereas the authors have emphasised that T and N should be sufficiently larger for this 
convergence to be feasible, as far as we know, they have stopped short of eliciting how “large 
is large”. Within the context of this study, we are confronted with three major concerns. First, 
we cannot stretch N further because we have engaged 53 countries in Africa. The exclusion of 
South Sudan is because data for the country is not available before 2011. Second, extending T 
to a period before 1996 is not possible because good governance indicators are only available 
from 1996. Third, we cannot employ annual periodicities instead of non-overlapping intervals 
because we have several analytical and methodological constraints. Moreover, recent African 
development literature on unbundling institutions (albeit with lower values of T and N) has 
established that inferences with bundled governance indicators are valid (Asongu and 
Nwachukwu 2015a; Asongu 2016a).   
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique 
 Previous literature on fighting terrorism has employed the following estimation 
approaches:  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (Tavares 2004; Bravo and Dias 2006); Negative 
Binomial and Zero-inflated Negative Binomial regressions  (Drakos and Gofas 2006; Savun 
and Phillips 2009); the multilevel Poisson model (Lee 2013); logistic regression (Kavanagh 
2011; Bhavani 2011) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Bandyopadhyay et al. 
2014). We adopt the GMM approach for reasons that are supported by both empirical 
literature and requirements of the estimation approach.  
In the light of the above, at least four main factors motivate the choice of a GMM 
estimation technique (Asongu and  De Moor, 2017; Tchamyou and Asongu, 2017). First, the 
number of years per country (T) is lower than the number of countries (N). Second, the 
estimation approach controls for potential endogeneity in all regressors.  In essence, in 
addition to controlling for simultaneity by instrumenting regressors, the bite on endogeneity is 
also increased by accounting for time invariant omitted variables. It is important to note that 
most of the highlighted empirical approaches in the terrorism literature have failed to address 
the concerns about endogeneity (e.g. OLS and logistic regressions). Moreover, Krieger and 
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Meierrieks (2015) have recently shown that it is difficult to establish robust results without 
tackling this concern of endogeneity.  
Third, cross-country differences are not eliminated by the estimation technique. 
Fourth, the system estimator corrects for small sample bias issues in the difference estimator. 
It is essentially for this fourth motivation that Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) have recommended 
that the system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998) be 
preferred to the difference estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
 Within the specific framework of this study, we adopt the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) that employs forward orthogonal deviations instead 
of first differences. The estimation technique has been documented to: limit the proliferation 
of instruments or restrict over-identification and control for cross-sectional dependence (see 
Love and Zicchino 2006; Baltagi 2008). A two-step approach is adopted in the specification 
because it controls for heteroscedasticity. In essence, the one-step approach is consistent with 
homoscedasticity.   
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where tiT , , is a terrorism variable (domestic, transnational, unclear and total) of country i
 
at  
period t ;  tiG ,
 
is a governance indicator (political, economic or institutional governance); 
0 is a constant;
 
 represents the coefficient of autocorrelation; W  is the vector of control 
variables  (internet penetration, inclusive development, economic growth, inflation, and 
military expenditure),
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect, t
 
is the time-specific constant  and 
ti ,  the error term. 
 
3.2.3 Exclusion restriction  
 
Consistent with Love and Zicchino (2006), Dewan and Ramaprasad (2014) and 
Asongu and De Moor (2017), we treat all independent variables as suspected endogenous or 
predetermined variables.  Therefore, the gmmstyle is adopted for them. Only years are treated 
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as exogenous and the method for treating the ivstyle (years) is “iv(years, eq(diff))” because it 
is not possible for the years to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman 2009b).  
As recently documented by Asongu and De Moor (2017), in order to address the 
concern about simultaneity, lagged regressors are used as instruments for forward-differenced 
variables. In essence, in order to remove fixed effects that could affect the investigated 
nexuses, Helmet transformations are performed for the regressors, in line with Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Love and Zicchino (2006). These transformations consist of forward mean-
differencing of the variables: instead of subtracting the pervious observation from the 
contemporaneous one (see Roodman 2009b, p. 104), the mean of all future observations is 
subtracted from the variables.  
We further argue that years or instruments which are treated as strictly exogenous 
affect the outcome variable only via the endogenous explaining variables. The statistical 
validity of this exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
instrument exogeneity.  In essence, the null hypothesis of the test should not be rejected for 
the instruments to explain the outcome variable exclusively through the endogenous 
explaining variables.  In a standard instrumental variable (IV) procedure, failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that the 
instruments do not elicit the outcome variable beyond engaged channels of endogenous 
explaining variables. While this information criterion has been substantially used in the 
literature employing an IV estimation strategy (see Beck et al. 2003), the DHT in a GMM 
procedure is used to assesses whether years exhibit strict exogeneity, by not explaining 
terrorism beyond the proposed channels (or endogenous explaining variables). Hence, 
reported findings should confirm the validity of the exclusion restriction if the null hypotheses 
of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) are not rejected.  
 
4. Empirical analysis  
4.1 Presentation of results  
 Four main information criteria are used to assess the validity of  a GMM model with 
forward orthogonal deviations (See Asongu and De Moor 2017). First, the null hypothesis of 
the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference should not be 
rejected because it argues for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Second, the 
alternative hypothesis of the Sargan (Hansen) over-identification restrictions (OIR) test 
should be rejected because it is of the position that the instruments are correlated with the 
error terms and hence, not valid. It is important to note that the Hansen (Sargan) OIR test is 
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robust (not robust) but weakened (not weakened) by instruments. In essence, for the 
restriction of overidentification, we have ensured that rule of thumb or criterion for limiting 
the proliferation of instruments is met. Accordingly, for each specification, the number of 
instruments is lower than the corresponding number of countries. In addition, the Hansen OIR 
test is further examined with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. 
Fourth, the Fisher test is also provided to assess the joint validity of estimated coefficients. 
Since the Hansen test is robust but weakened by instruments (compared to the Sargan test that 
is not robust, but not weakened by instruments), the Hansen test is prioritised to the Sargan 
test and the issue of instrument proliferation is addressed by respecting the rule of thumb for 
the avoidance of instrument proliferation, notably: the number of instruments should be less 
than the number of cross sections in each specification. 
 Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively show findings for political governance, economic 
governance, institutional governance and general governance. The first-three tables have 
three-different sets of specifications which correspond to respective composite indicators and 
their two constituents.  
The following findings can be established from Table 2 on the nexus between political 
governance and terrorism. First, political governance and its constituents (voice & 
accountability and political stability) respectively have negative effects on all terrorism 
dynamics. Second, irrespective of governance variables, the negative effect increases 
consistently with the following order to increasing negative magnitude: unclear terrorism, 
transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism and total terrorism. Third, the terrorism variables 
are stationary because their lagged absolute values are between zero and one. Fourth, most of 
the significant control variables have the expected signs: (i) inclusive development, military 
expenditure and economic growth decrease terrorism while (ii) internet penetration increases 
it.  
In Table 3, with the exceptions of: (i) unclear terrorism for which economic 
governance and its constituents are not significant and (ii) total terrorism for which the effect 
of regulation quality is not significant; economic governance and its constituent components 
negatively affect terrorism dynamics. The negative magnitude on domestic terrorism is 
consistently higher than that on transnational terrorism. There is consistent evidence of 
convergence and most of the significant control variables have expected signs.  
The discourse of findings in Table 4 is consistent with that of Table 3 on nexuses 
between institutional governance and terrorism. In Table 5 on linkages between general 
governance and terrorism: (i) the effect of governance is consistently negative on terrorism 
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dynamics; (ii) there is evidence of convergence and (iii) the significant control variables have 
the expected signs.  
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Table 2: Political governance and terrorism    
             
 Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
 
   
 Voice and Accountability   Political Stability   Political Governance 
    
 Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  0.282*** -0.025 0.069*** 0.331 0.243*** 0.200*** 0.074*** 0.262** 0.639*** 0.406*** 0.119*** 0.593** 
 (0.225) (0.787) (0.006) (0.221) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.822***  --- --- 0.716*** --- --- --- 0.715*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Trans. Terror(-1) --- 0.342*** --- --- --- 0.188** --- --- --- 0.159 --- --- 
  (0.004)    (0.044)    (0.129)   
Unclear Terror (-1) --- --- 0.745*** --- --- --- 0.616*** --- --- --- 0.540*** --- 
   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- 0.654***  --- --- 0.540*** --- --- --- 0.515*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Voice & Accountability -0.307*** -0.172*** -0.008* -0.317*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.062) (0.000)         
Political Stability ---  --- --- -0.464*** -0.382*** -0.052*** -0.560*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Political governance  ---  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.343*** -0.316*** -0.025*** -0.447*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet  0.007** 0.002* -0.00008 0.006* 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.0009 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.0001 0.018*** 
 (0.010) (0.075) (0.925) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.387) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.890) (0.002) 
Inclusive development -0.020*** -0.003 -0.0001 -0.017*** -0.026*** -0.006*** -0.0007*** -0.023*** -0.017*** 0.001 0.00001 -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.245) (0.413) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.505) (0.956) (0.008) 
GDPg growth  0.0004 -0.007 -0.004** -0.008 -0.016 -0.022*** -0.006** -0.028** -0.019 -0.025** -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.978) (0.370) (0.020) (0.646) (0.141) (0.004) (0.013) (0.018) (0.241) (0.013) (0.191) (0.600) 
Inflation -0.001 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.005*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.005*** 
 (0.477) (0.002) (0.000) (0.630) (0.001) (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.002) 
Military Expenditure  -0.140* -0.011 -0.019* -0.109 -0.105** -0.072** -0.007 -0.102** -0.176*** -0.056* -0.028*** -0.135* 
 (0.075) (0.725) (0.085) (0.267) (0.011) (0.033) (0.497) (0.035) (0.005) (0.069) (0.002) (0.088) 
             
AR(1) (0.010) (0.011) (0.057) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.058) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.081) (0.017) 
AR(2) (0.830) (0.715) (0.296) (0.653) (0.454) (0.934) (0.312) (0.260) (0.569) (0.903) (0.296) (0.306) 
Sargan OIR (0.038) (0.001) (0.054) (0.006) (0.026) (0.001) (0.059) (0.007) (0.032) (0.001) (0.049) (0.007) 
Hansen OIR (0.037) (0.656) (0.720) (0.150) (0.185) (0.425) (0.548) (0.201) (0.050) (0.668) (0.828) (0.141) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.116) (0.233) (0.662) (0.189) (0.072) (0.175) (0.337) (0.033) (0.088) (0.162) (0.614) (0.050) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.070) (0.847) (0.616) (0.219) (0.470) (0.650) (0.628) (0.679) (0.120) (0.920) (0.793) (0.445) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.127) (0.777) (0.768) (0.200) (0.131) (0.279) (0.456) (0.142) (0.073) (0.656) (0.714) (0.207) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.031) (0.211) (0.334) (0.183) (0.586) (0.874) (0.643) (0.612) (0.151) (0.457) (0.855) (0.149) 
             
Fisher  378.41*** 258.93*** 91.80*** 205.41*** 899.84*** 234.88*** 95.26*** 894.29*** 656.84*** 176.60*** 49.39*** 748.78*** 
Instruments  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Countries  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations  167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of 
bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the OIR and DHT tests.  
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Table 3: Economic governance and terrorism    
             
 Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
 
   
 Regulation Quality    Government Effectiveness    Economic Governance  
    
 Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  0.301*** 0.094 0.028 0.497*** 0.015 0.136 0.042*** 0.224 0.320** 0.293*** 0.079*** 0.514*** 
 (0.004) (0.266) (0.130) (0.001) (0.910) (0.108) (0.001) (0.214) (0.017) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.882*** --- --- --- 0.872*** --- --- --- 0.941*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Trans. Terror(-1) --- 0.323*** --- --- --- 0.437*** --- --- --- 0.398*** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Unclear Terror (-1) --- --- 0.651*** --- --- --- 0.544*** --- --- --- 0.603*** --- 
   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- 0.774*** --- --- --- 0.726*** --- --- --- 0.774*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Regulation Quality   -0.129*** -0.092*** 0.002 0.025 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.696) (0.668)         
Government Effectiveness --- --- --- --- -0.307*** -0.161*** -0.006 -0.237*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.529) (0.000)     
Economic  Governance  --- --- --- --- --- ---- --- --- -0.103*** -0.056*** -0.002 -0.055** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.652) (0.024) 
Internet  0.007*** 0.0007 -0.0002 0.002 0.016*** 0.004*** -0.0009 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.001 -0.001 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.642) (0.772) (0.231) (0.000) (0.007) (0.407) (0.000) (0.000) (0.268) (0.345) (0.002) 
Inclusive development -0.027*** -0.005*** -0.0005*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.006*** -0.0001 -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.005*** -0.0002 -0.026*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.515) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.207) (0.000) 
GDPg growth  0.007 -0.018** -0.001 -0.001 0.008 -0.016* -0.001 -0.006 0.006 -0.019** -0.001 -0.012 
 (0.536) (0.045) (0.441) (0.885) (0.585) (0.072) (0.532) (0.688) (0.676) (0.028) (0.408) (0.336) 
Inflation 0.001 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.005*** -0.0001 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.002 0.0006 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.003** 
 (0.163) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.917) (0.001) (0.000) (0.166) (0.583) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) 
Military Expenditure  -0.115** -0.025 0.006 -0.097 -0.100** -0.079*** -0.007 -0.110 -0.102** -0.047* -0.011 -0.115 
 (0.014) (0.287) (0.560) (0.149) (0.049) (0.007) (0.390) (0.174) (0.037) (0.063) (0.299) (0.116) 
             
AR(1) (0.010) (0.018) (0.075) (0.005) (0.010) (0.014) (0.103) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.075) (0.006) 
AR(2) (0.619) (0.799) (0.290) (0.832) (0.716) (0.928) (0.298) (0.756) (0.663) (0.875) (0.289) (0.789) 
Sargan OIR (0.034) (0.000) (0.046) (0.012) (0.020) (0.000) (0.104) (0.003) (0.051) (0.000) (0.072) (0.010) 
Hansen OIR (0.240) (0.385) (0.232) (0.233) (0.153) (0.449) (0.703) (0.148) (0.213) (0.549) (0.811) (0.192) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.112) (0.394) (0.622) (0.104) (0.070) (0.273) (0.574) (0.031) (0.136) (0.356) (0.502) (0.055) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.477) (0.381) (0.132) (0.482) (0.405) (0.564) (0.649) (0.565) (0.386) (0.613) (0.831) (0.548) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.354) (0.415) (0.671) (0.297) (0.310) (0.299) (0.828) (0.226) (0.281) (0.421) (0.837) (0.232) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.143) (0.307) (0.018) (0.201) (0.072) (0.876) (0.203) (0.138) (0.187) (0.769) (0.395) (0.226) 
             
Fisher  592.87*** 196.26*** 125.54*** 198.18*** 507.85*** 90.25*** 55.94*** 270.06*** 639.26*** 136.62*** 84.78*** 228.66*** 
Instruments  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Countries  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations  167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of 
bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the OIR and DHT tests.  
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Table 4: Institutional governance and terrorism    
             
 Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
 
   
 Rule of Law    Corruption-Control Institutional  Governance 
    
 Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  0.210* 0.111 0.041** 0.440*** 0.179 0.061 0.058*** 0.271** 0.236 0.187** 0.051** 0.396** 
 (0.079) (0.144) (0.029) (0.003) (0.130) (0.398) (0.003) (0.033) (0.115) (0.048) (0.010) (0.018) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.846*** --- --- --- 0.930*** --- --- --- 0.939*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
Trans. Terror(-1) --- 0.337*** --- --- --- 0.415*** --- --- --- 0.363*** --- --- 
  (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Unclear Terror (-1) --- --- 0.539*** --- --- --- 0.594*** --- --- --- 0.620*** --- 
   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- 0.669*** --- --- --- 0.726*** --- --- --- 0.723*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Rule of Law   -0.251*** -0.113*** -0.009 -0.062 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.496) (0.466)         
Corruption-Control --- --- --- --- -0.263*** -0.161*** -0.016 -0.213*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.159) (0.000)     
Institutional  Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.156*** -0.083*** -0.008 -0.108*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.171) (0.000) 
Internet  0.011*** 0.002* -0.001 0.005** 0.009*** 0.003** -0.0004 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.004*** -0.0003 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.075) (0.327) (0.015) (0.000) (0.042) (0.700) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.733) (0.000) 
Inclusive development -0.027*** -0.006*** -0.0002 -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.005*** -0.0003 -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.005*** -0.00009 -0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.231) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.685) (0.000) 
GDPg growth  -0.0006 -0.019** -0.001 -0.006 0.004 -0.013* -0.0005 -0.003 -0.0002 -0.017** -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.961) (0.029) (0.650) (0.614) (0.757) (0.099) (0.801) (0.760) (0.985) (0.048) (0.408) (0.549) 
Inflation -0.0003 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.004** 0.0003 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.003** -0.0007 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.002 
 (0.795) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.747) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.532) (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) 
Military Expenditure  -0.109** -0.041 -0.006 -0.080 -0.121** -0.064** -0.001*** -0.086 -0.113** -0.053** -0.008 -0.081 
 (0.044) (0.109) (0.514) (0.290) (0.020) (0.018) (0.000) (0.175) (0.022) (0.047) (0.428) (0.239) 
             
AR(1) (0.013) (0.016) (0.097) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.088) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.073) (0.010) 
AR(2) (0.842) (0.809) (0.305) (0.781) (0.632) (0.872) (0.283) (0.828) (0.764) (0.854) (0.293) (0.756) 
Sargan OIR (0.019) (0.001) (0.033) (0.004) (0.078) (0.001) (0.103) (0.016) (0.061) (0.001) (0.063) (0.010) 
Hansen OIR (0.119) (0.609) (0.803) (0.114) (0.121) (0.429) (0.432) (0.140) (0.074) (0.460) (0.580) (0.070) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.080) (0.261) (0.696) (0.168) (0.079) (0.156) (0.379) (0.016) (0.035) (0.242) (0.398) (0.007) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.299) (0.772) (0.710) (0.176) (0.306) (0.685) (0.449) (0.685) (0.312) (0.610) (0.617) (0.621) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.177) (0.690) (0.827) (0.385) (0.184) (0.360) (0.618) (0.236) (0.147) (0.362) (0.525) (0.165) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.146) (0.267) (0.399) (0.022) (0.139) (0.567) (0.130) (0.112) (0.085) (0.666) (0.542) (0.061) 
             
Fisher  388.55*** 175.20*** 34.60*** 198.90*** 764.93*** 96.03*** 53.27*** 252.41*** 650.05*** 97.39*** 50.40*** 267.44*** 
Instruments  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Countries  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations  167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of 
bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the OIR and DHT tests.  
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Table 5: General governance and terrorism    
     
 Dependent variables: Terrorism Dynamics     
 
  
 Domestic Terror  Trans. Terror  Unclear Terror Total Terror 
Constant  0.345** 0.366*** 0.089*** 0.390* 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.066) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.911*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    
Trans. Terror(-1) --- 0.343*** --- --- 
  (0.000)   
Unclear Terror (-1) --- --- 0.592*** --- 
   (0.000)  
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- 0.717*** 
    (0.000) 
General Governance    -0.112*** -0.083*** -0.006* -0.109*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) 
Internet  0.014*** 0.006*** -0.0002 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.830) (0.000) 
Inclusive development -0.024*** -0.002 0.0001 -0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.198) (0.501) (0.000) 
GDPg growth  -0.001 -0.023*** -0.001 -0.016 
 (0.901) (0.006) (0.539) (0.211) 
Inflation -0.001 0.001** -0.001*** 0.0002 
 (0.283) (0.026) (0.000) (0.874) 
Military Expenditure  -0.121** -0.068*** -0.019** -0.127* 
 (0.024) (0.006) (0.046) (0.079) 
AR(1) (0.010) (0.015) (0.066) (0.009) 
AR(2) (0.832) (0.935) (0.285) (0.696) 
Sargan OIR (0.035) (0.000) (0.085) (0.004) 
Hansen OIR (0.050) (0.608) (0.653) (0.076) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.053) (0.255) (0.514) (0.012) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.169) (0.775) (0.626) (0.516) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.164) (0.491) (0.530) (0.163) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.032) (0.736) (0.769) (0.072) 
     
Fisher  590.23*** 116.84*** 45.91*** 314.47*** 
Instruments  30 30 30 30 
Countries  49 49 49 49 
Observations  167 167 167 167 
     
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests.  
 
 
4.2 Robustness checks using alternative specifications and conditioning information sets  
  
 This section investigates the robustness of the findings established in Section 4.1. 
Accordingly, we assess whether the established effects withstand further empirical scrutiny 
when an alternative specification and a different conditioning information set are employed. 
The alternative modeling consists of including the lags of other terrorism variables in the 
specification whereas the new set of control variables include: urbanization, population 
growth, foreign aid and openness in terms of foreign direct investment and trade.  
 The following findings can be established in Tables 6 on the nexus between political 
governance and terrorism. First, for the most part, political governance and its constituents 
25 
 
(voice & accountability and political stability) respectively have negative effects on terrorism. 
Exceptions to these include: unclear terrorism in regressions pertaining to political stability 
and political governance on the one hand and on the other hand, insignificant effects on 
domestic, unclear and total terrorism from “voice & accountability”-oriented estimations.  
Second, we do not engage the expected signs of the lagged terrorism variables because they 
are highly correlated among themselves. In essence, in presence of multicollinearity, variables 
enter into conflict and not all emerge with the expected signs in the estimation output (see 
Beck et al. 2003).  It is important to note that such issues of multicollinearity do not concern 
the independent variables of interest (or governance indicators) employed in the study. Third, 
the order of magnitude in the significance of estimated coefficients established in Table 2 is 
not apparent in Table 6.  
 In Table 7, regulation quality reduces transnational terrorism whereas government 
effectiveness decreases both transitional and unclear terrorism. In Table 8, institutional 
governance and its constitutions (corruption-control and the rule of law) mitigate transnational 
terrorism, while the rule of law (institutional governance) further reduces unclear (total) 
terrorism. Both transnational and unclear terrorism are significantly curbed by general 
governance in Table 9. Most of the control variables in Table 6-9 are significant. The findings 
in Tables 2-9 are also robust to the inclusion of trend instead of year fixed effects. 
Unfortunately, eight more tables cannot be reported because of space constraint.  
 The following are more distinctive features between baseline regressions (Tables 2-5) 
and robustness checks (Tables 6-9).  First, whereas political governance and its constituents 
consistently have negative effects on terrorism in baseline regressions (Table 2), in the 
robustness checks (Table 6), the effects of political governance and constituents are not 
significant on unclear terrorism. Moreover, “voice & accountability” does not significantly 
influence domestic terrorism.  Second, economic governance and its constituents largely 
affect terrorism negatively in baseline regressions, with the exception of a consistent 
insignificant effect on unclear terrorism (Table 3). Conversely, for the most part, in the 
robustness checks (Table 7), the corresponding effects are not significant on at least two 
terrorism dynamics. Moreover, effects of domestic terrorism and total terrorism are 
consistently insignificant. Third, with regard to institutional governance, the comparative 
insights between Table 3 and Table 7 are broadly consistent with the differences between 
Table 4 and Table 8. Moreover, from the perspective of general governance, the underlying 
comparative insights from Table 3 (versus Table 7) and Table 4 (versus Table 8)  can also be 
extended to differences between Table 5 (in baseline regressions) and Table 9 (for robust 
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regressions). This is essentially because, whereas the findings in the baseline regressions 
pertaining to general governance are overwhelmingly significant, corresponding results in 
robustness specifications are not significant on domestic terrorism and total terrorism.  
 We further attempt to validate the GMM results by exploring what the traditional fixed 
effects models suggest. Hence, we replicate Tables 2-9 using fixed effects regressions4. In 
what follows, the first point compares the baseline regressions with the fixed effects 
regressions whereas the second point compares the robustness check results with the fixed 
effects estimations. Hence, the term “expected” is used to articulate consistency with the 
GMM results. First, from the baseline regressions, fixed effects estimates have:  (i) expected 
significant signs with a higher negative magnitude for political governance regressions; (ii) 
unexpected insignificant positive signs for economic governance regressions (iii) expected 
insignificant negative effects from institutional governance regressions and (iv) expected 
negative signs with a higher magnitude in regressions pertaining to general governance. 
Second, with regard to the robustness checks, corresponding fixed effects estimates: (i) have 
expected significant signs with a higher negative magnitude for political governance 
regressions; (ii) largely have expected significant signs with a higher negative magnitude for 
economic governance regressions; (iii) substantially display expected insignificant negative 
effects from institutional governance regressions and (iv)  show expected negative signs with 
a higher  magnitude in regressions pertaining to general governance. In terms of signs and 
significance, the fixed effects results are broadly consistent with the GMM findings. 
                                                 
4
 The fixed effects results are not reported because of lack of space.  
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Table 6: Political governance and terrorism    
             
 
Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
 
   
 
Voice and Accountability   Political Stability   Political Governance  
    
 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  -0.081 0.103* -0.004 -0.205 0.331 0.315*** 0.056 0.293 0.120 0.447*** 0.062 0.068 
 (0.789) (0.099) (0.926) (0.412) (0.151) (0.002) (0.188) (0.229) (0.623) (0.000) (0.168) (0.781) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.505*** 0.144** 0.118*** --- 0.530*** 0.115*** 0.084***  0.469*** 0.166*** 0.098*** --- 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)  
Trans. Terror(-1) -0.027 0.233*** 0.028 --- -0.015 0.021 0.022  -0.063 -0.011 -0.014 --- 
 (0.789) (0.004) (0.146)  (0.858) (0.792) (0.181)  (0.442) (0.848) (0.449)  
Unclear Terror (-1) -0.078 -0.468** -0.006 --- -0.471 -0.188 0.050 --- -0.177 -0.159 0.043 --- 
 (0.863) (0.047) (0.918)  (0.151) (0.289) (0.433)  (0.641) (0.362) (0.556)  
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- 0.533*** --- --- --- 0.386*** --- --- --- 0.359*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Voice & Accountability 0.005 -0.126*** -0.009 0.059 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.950) (0.000) (0.631) (0.617)         
Political Stability --- --- --- --- -0.213** -0.254*** -0.010 -0.335*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.012) (0.000) (0.418) (0.004)     
Political governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.131** -0.175*** -0.007 -0.199** 
         (0.022) (0.000) (0.555) (0.044) 
Urbanisation  -0.109*** 0.013 -0.011 -0.136** -0.197*** -0.068* -0.013 -0.227*** -0.165*** -0.030 -0.011 -0.174** 
 (0.003) (0.642) (0.178) (0.011) (0.002) (0.077) (0.312) (0.005) (0.001) (0.379) (0.312) (0.020) 
Population growth  0.117* -0.088* 0.016 0.197** 0.113 -0.039 0.004 0.147 0.165* -0.063 0.004 0.167 
 (0.071) (0.080) (0.150) (0.026) (0.243) (0.501) (0.842) (0.193) (0.099) (0.303) (0.820) (0.172) 
Foreign Investment  0.004 -0.005** 0.0004 0.0006 0.001 -0.004** 0.0002 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.0002 -0.003 
 (0.108) (0.027) (0.480) (0.840) (0.501) (0.044) (0.718) (0.243) (0.342) (0.189) (0.685) (0.284) 
Foreign Aid 0.001 0.001 -0.0009* -0.003 0.0008 -0.004*** -0.0001 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.709) (0.225) (0.091) (0.606) (0.804) (0.006) (0.853) (0.173) (0.697) (0.471) (0.534) (0.911) 
Trade Openness  0.006** 0.001 0.0002 0.009*** 0.003 0.001* -0.0001 0.005** 0.005** 0.0001 -0.0002 0.007*** 
 (0.020) (0.240) (0.649) (0.000) (0.114) (0.053) (0.691) (0.024) (0.039) (0.885) (0.546) (0.003) 
             
AR(1) (0.048) (0.126) (0.075) (0.017) (0.041) (0.132) (0.057) (0.023) (0.044) (0.180) (0.053) (0.036) 
AR(2) (0.895) (0.461) (0.416) (0.698) (0.915) (0.339) (0.408) (0.446) (0.992) (0.316) (0.408) (0.524) 
Sargan OIR (0.370) (0.000) (0.135) (0.239) (0.235) (0.000) (0.139) (0.067) (0.524) (0.001) (0.111) (0.187) 
Hansen OIR (0.125) (0.300) (0.449) (0.434) (0.084) (0.285) (0.574) (0.143) (0.114) (0.457) (0.485) (0.371) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.590) (0.338) (0.475) (0.239) (0.168) (0.214) (0.364) (0.100) (0.200) (0.212) (0.490) (0.105) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.066) (0.317) (0.408) (0.522) (0.127) (0.394) (0.632) (0.313) (0.155) (0.628) (0.441) (0.702) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.227) (0.332) (0.865) (0.363) (0.167) (0.310) (0.764) (0.151) (0.177) (0.336) (0.883) (0.319) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.092) (0.279) (0.023) (0.574) (0.080) (0.291) (0.126) (0.283) (0.130) (0.782) (0.025) (0.509) 
             
Fisher  28.52*** 10.60*** 99.49*** 16.85*** 24.94*** 21.61*** 109.84*** 25.67*** 26.75*** 12.36*** 114.81*** 24.80*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 30 34 34 34 30 34 34 34 30 
Countries  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Observations  200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold  
values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments 
 in the OIR and DHT tests.  
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  Table 7: Economic governance and terrorism    
             
 
Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
 
   
 
Regulation Quality    Government Effectiveness    Economic Governance  
    
 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  -0.023 -0.008 0.006 -0.280 -0.080 0.117 0.041 -0.297 -0.107 0.230** 0.037 -0.620** 
 (0.935) (0.928) (0.878) (0.335) (0.775) (0.324) (0.378) (0.298) (0.681) (0.011) (0.440) (0.013) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.508*** 0.154*** 0.109*** --- 0.473*** 0.156*** 0.115***  0.515*** 0.174*** 0.120*** --- 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  
Trans. Terror(-1) -0.051 0.232*** 0.038** --- -0.077 0.109 -0.037 --- -0.075 0.114 0.031* --- 
 (0.682) (0.005) (0.041)  (0.497) (0.165) (0.577)  (0.532) (0.157) (0.076)  
Unclear Terror (-1) -0.099 -0.251 -0.050 --- 0.096 -0.065 -0.037 --- -0.062 -0.274 -0.077 --- 
 (0.850) (0.190) (0.318)  (0.817) (0.765) (0.577)  (0.899) (0.180) (0.200)  
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- 0.484*** --- --- --- 0.434*** --- --- --- 0.461*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Regulation Quality   0.054 -0.129* -0.013 0.116 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.539) (0.071) (0.469) (0.387)         
Government Effectiveness --- --- --- --- 0.028 -0.295*** -0.026* 0.066 --- --- --- --- 
     (0.739) (0.000) (0.093) (0.648)     
Economic  Governance  --- --- --- --- --- ---- --- --- 0.024 0.112*** -0.009 0.048 
         (0.537) (0.005) (0.241) (0.455) 
Urbanisation  -0.083 0.0005 -0.004 -0.084 -0.015 0.042 -0.0002 -0.027 -0.039 0.023 -0.001 -0.060 
 (0.137) (0.983) (0.586) (0.192) (0.637) (0.200) (0.982) (0.619) (0.322) (0.422) (0.824) (0.257) 
Population growth  0.071 -0.083** -0.0001 0.135 0.013 -0.175*** -0.008 0.105 0.057 -0.127** -0.006 0.140* 
 (0.382) (0.033) (0.987) (0.140) (0.789) (0.002) (0.433) (0.212) (0.356) (0.013) (0.519) (0.081) 
Foreign Investment  0.007** -0.002 0.0008 0.003 0.005* -0.002 0.0007 0.002 0.007** -0.001 0.0008 0.002 
 (0.027) (0.175) (0.106) (0.387) (0.071) (0.123) (0.285) (0.488) (0.031) (0.474) (0.119) (0.430) 
Foreign Aid 0.004 0.001 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.004 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.003 0.001 -0.0004 -0.0009 
 (0.396) (0.426) (0.154) (0.927) (0.295) (0.707) (0.387) (0.965) (0.488) (0.474) (0.286) (0.861) 
Trade Openness  0.005** 0.002** 0.0002 0.009*** 0.004** -0.045 -0.0003 0.007*** 0.004** 0.001 -0.00003 0.008*** 
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.625) (0.002) (0.033) (0.111) (0.364) (0.002) (0.046) (0.227) (0.935) (0.001) 
             
AR(1) (0.064) (0.105) (0.104) (0.024) (0.064) (0.104) (0.090) (0.031) (0.058) (0.131) (0.101) (0.029) 
AR(2) (0.825) (0.411) (0.367) (0.741) (0.941) (0.287) (0.382) (0.754) (0.872) (0.396) (0.358) (0.758) 
Sargan OIR (0.432) (0.000) (0.148) (0.191) (0.280) (0.000) (0.180) (0.172) (0.319) (0.000) (0.163) (0.150) 
Hansen OIR (0.173) (0.251) (0.614) (0.476) (0.207) (0.195) (0.457) (0.589) (0.213) (0.180) (0.579) (0.547) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.525) (0.144) (0.681) (0.121) (0.258) (0.199) (0.668) (0.108) (0.561) (0.156) (0.769) (0.122) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.114) (0.426) (0.482) (0.801) (0.250) (0.277) (0.320) (0.922) (0.138) (0.295) (0.383) (0.871) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))            
 
H excluding group (0.234) (0.157) (0.787) (0.500) (0.251) (0.151) (0.812) (0.551) (0.248) (0.108) (0.689) (0.514) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.174) (0.810) (0.140) (0.339) (0.220) (0.538) (0.039) (0.499) (0.243) (0.780) (0.213) (0.478) 
             
Fisher  52.18*** 9.91*** 37.95*** 13.02*** 47.23*** 7.30*** 35.38*** 15.31*** 55.28*** 7.69*** 32.27*** 15.81*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 30 34 34 34 30 34 34 34 30 
Countries  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Observations  200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
             
   *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold  
   values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments 
    in the OIR and DHT tests.  
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Table 8: Institutional governance and terrorism    
             
 
Dependent Variables: Terrorism Dynamics 
 
   
 
Rule of Law    Corruption-Control    Institutional  Governance  
    
 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Domestic 
Terror  
Trans. 
Terror  
Unclear 
Terror 
Total  
Terror 
Constant  -0.202 0.071 0.038 -0.306 0.113 0.104 0.034 -0.227 -0.080 0.272** 0.062 -0.290 
 (0.437) (0.512) (0.478) (0.258) (0.616) (0.348) (0.428) (0.355) (0.736) (0.015) (0.236) (0.236) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.525*** 0.140*** 0.119*** --- 0.599*** 0.136*** 0.109*** --- 0.549*** 0.135*** 0.115*** --- 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)  
Trans. Terror(-1) -0.077 0.184** 0.040** --- -0.170 0.118** 0.039** --- -0.115 0.140** 0.029* --- 
 (0.440) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.151) (0.038) (0.032)  (0.319) (0.046) (0.079)  
Unclear Terror (-1) -0.060 -0.361 -0.054 --- -0.353 -0.198 0.011 --- -0.121 -0.278 -0.010 --- 
 (0.888) (0.120) (0.436)  (0.372) (0.463) (0.853)  (0.780) (0.335) (0.874)  
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- 0.467*** --- --- --- 0.487*** --- --- --- 0.485*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Rule of Law   -0.027 -0.269*** -0.029* 0.019 --- --- ---  ---   --- 
 (0.772) (0.008) (0.097) (0.891)         
Corruption-Control --- --- --- --- -0.117 -0.268*** -0.009 -0.117 --- --- --- --- 
     (0.285) (0.001) (0.352) (0.470)     
Institutional  Governance  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.050 -0.129*** -0.009 -0.040*** 
         (0.288) (0.001) (0.141) (0.000) 
Urbanisation  -0.013 -0.019 -0.011 0.017 -0.075 -0.028 -0.007 -0.037 -0.043 -0.022 0.004 -0.035 
 (0.709) (0.633) (0.122) (0.721) (0.261) (0.383) (0.519) (0.634) (0.285) (0.465) (0.656) (0.545) 
Population growth  0.041 -0.087 0.002 0.020 0.036 -0.087* -0.003 0.027 0.046 -0.092* -0.017 0.057 
 (0.420) (0.184) (0.803) (0.767) (0.689) (0.075) (0.766) (0.792) (0.472) (0.070) (0.187) (0.479) 
Foreign Investment  0.006** -0.004** 0.0003 0.002 0.007** -0.001 0.0003 0.004 0.006** -0.002 0.0007 0.002 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.519) (0.366) (0.028) (0.615) (0.532) (0.150) (0.028) (0.197) (0.228) (0.437) 
Foreign Aid 0.004 0.001 -0.0006 0.004 0.002 0.0009 -0.0002 0.003 0.003 -0.092* -0.0002 0.002 
 (0.381) (0.435) (0.233) (0.439) (0.649) (0.559) (0.686) (0.627) (0.451) (0.070) (0.688) (0.633) 
Trade Openness  0.004** 0.002* -0.00007 0.006*** 0.002 0.002* 0.00001 0.006*** 0.004** -0.002 -0.0003 0.007*** 
 (0.022) (0.082) (0.849) (0.007) (0.147) (0.055) (0.973) (0.001) (0.026) (0.197) (0.400) (0.002) 
             
             
AR(1) (0.055) (0.128) (0.078) (0.023) (0.043) (0.125) (0.070) (0.020) (0.049) (0.134) (0.071) (0.023) 
AR(2) (0.893) (0.324) (0.400) (0.775) (0.787) (0.291) (0.406) (0.746) (0.852) (0.288) (0.384) (0.725) 
Sargan OIR (0.312) (0.001) (0.219) (0.176) (0.529) (0.001) (0.084) (0.355) (0.400) (0.001) (0.116) (0.249) 
Hansen OIR 0.177) (0.391) (0.490) (0.616) (0.114) (0.445) (0.623) (0.357) (0.198) (0.400) (0.467) (0.605) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.324) (0.347) (0.677) (0.224) (0.160) (0.185) (0.516) (0.126) (0.173) (0.224) (0.499) (0.086) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.178) (0.421) (0.349) (0.816) (0.182) (0.647) (0.587) (0.637) (0.307) (0.541) (0.415) (0.957) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.228) (0.271) (0.926) (0.491) (0.163) (0.375) (0.805) (0.269) (0.233) (0.261) (0.856) (0.490) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.193) (0.804) (0.016) (0.764) (0.155) (0.580) (0.131) (0.647) (0.307) (0.890) (0.029) (0.730) 
             
Fisher  44.92*** 10.97*** 34.27*** 14.06*** 24.94*** 11.10*** 75.93*** 11.31*** 40.42*** 9.07*** 59.58*** 12.72*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 30 34 34 34 30 34 34 34 30 
Countries  52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Observations  200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold  
values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments 
 in the OIR and DHT tests.  
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Table 9: General governance and terrorism    
     
 Dependent variables: Terrorism Dynamics     
 
  
 Domestic Terror  Trans. Terror  Unclear Terror Total Terror 
Constant  -0.243 0.281*** 0.027 -0.402 
 (0.345) (0.001) (0.596) (0.125) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.503*** 0.173*** 0.123*** --- 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)  
Trans. Terror(-1) -0.054 0.055 0.014 --- 
 (0.596) (0.470) (0.402)  
Unclear Terror (-1) -0.049 -0.349 -0.059 --- 
 (0.912) (0.135) (0.370)  
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- 0.452*** 
    (0.000) 
General Governance    -0.022 -0.092*** -0.008* -0.003 
 (0.416) (0.000) (0.062) (0.938) 
Urbanisation  -0.082** -0.023 0.00004 -0.071 
 (0.012) (0.425) (0.996) (0.176) 
Population growth  0.111* -0.070 -0.005 0.154* 
 (0.076) (0.187) (0.619) (0.057) 
Foreign Investment  0.005* -0.002 0.0008 0.001 
 (0.057) (0.201) (0.163) (0.632) 
Foreign Aid 0.002 -0.00001 -0.0006 -0.0009 
 (0.699) (0.991) (0.153) (0.872) 
Trade Openness  0.004** 0.0009 -0.00003 0.009*** 
 (0.045) (0.366) (0.938) (0.001) 
     
AR(1) (0.049) (0.175) (0.090) (0.029) 
AR(2) (0.934) (0.362) (0.367) (0.727) 
Sargan OIR (0.434) (0.000) (0.136) (0.250) 
Hansen OIR (0.138) (0.289) (0.428) (0.536) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.226) (0.176) (0.613) (0.082) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.175) (0.443) (0.317) (0.922) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.244) (0.182) (0.841) (0.496) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.096) (0.835) (0.024) (0.492) 
    
 
Fisher  40.08*** 11.39*** 43.91*** 17.18*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 30 
Countries  52 52 52 52 
Observations  200 200 200 200 
     
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests.  
 
 
4.3 Discussion of results and policy implications 
 
4. 3.1 Nexus with the literature  
 The established negative governance-terrorism nexus is consistent with a stream of the 
literature that has focused on broad samples of developed and developing countries. 
Accordingly, the negative relationship with the rule of law is in accordance with Choi (2010) 
who has established a negative relationship between democratic rule of law and citizens’ 
willingness and opportunity of resorting to political violence and terrorism as means to 
resolving conflicts.  
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 Assuming that voice and accountability employed in the study can be similar to 
“publicity and press freedom” and transparency respectively, the findings from the 
perspective of accountability/transparency run counter to the conclusions of Bell et al. (2014) 
who have concluded that transparency is likely to increase domestic and transnational 
terrorisms. Hence, our findings do not provide empirical support for the narrative that freer 
information transmission endows radical dissidents with opportunities to employ violence as 
means to draw attention to their agendas. On the view of voice/“publicity and press freedom”, 
the findings also run counter to Hoffman et al. (2013) who have recently maintained that 
publicity and press freedom are instrumental in motivating terrorism.  
 The relationship between political stability/non violence and terrorism is logical and 
consistent with intuition because the presence of political instability provides opportunities for 
citizens to resort to violence as means to communicating their grievances. It is important to 
articulate that while most African countries are generally qualified as poor democracies or 
autocracies, most are also stable autocracies. Hence, while there are some pockets of failing 
states on the continent, the weight of stable regimes is more relevant in the role of political 
governance on terrorism. It is important to articulate the notion of stable autocracies because 
as emphasized by Lai (2007) and Piazza (2008a), it is difficult to control terrorism in failed 
and failing states. Hence, the absence of sound democratic/political competition is not very 
likely to stimulate terrorists’ organizations to resort to violence in the settlement of 
grievances.  
 Overall the consistent negative nexus between governance and terrorism is not in 
accordance with the stream of literature suggesting that the characteristics of good governance 
are likely to induce terrorist activities. This includes both theoretical (Schmid 1992; Eubank 
and Weinberg 1994; Drakos and Gofas 2006; Piazza 2007) and empirical (Eubank and 
Weinberg 1994, 2001; Weinberg and Eubank 1998; Piazza 2007, 2008b; Chenoweth 2010) 
literatures. On the other hand, the findings accord with the stream of literature on the positive 
rewards of governance in mitigating terrorism activities, namely: theories of political access 
(Eyerman 1998) and empirical literature from perspectives of the rule of law (Choi 2010) and 
independence of the judiciary (Findley and Young 2011). As a point of synthesis, in the light 
of Li (2005), competing effects of good governance may not be apparent because: 
government constraints are not resulting in political deadlocks from checks and balances on 
the one hand and political participation reduces transnational terrorism on the other hand. 
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4.3.2 Practical contributions  
 Practical implications are discussed on three fronts, notably, in the light of the: 
conception and definition of governance variables; specificities of findings and inappropriate 
use of the governance term in the literature.  
 On the first front, three points are worth emphasizing. The election and replacement of 
political leaders (or political governance) reduces terrorism. The formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities (or economic governance) 
mitigates terrorism. The respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern 
interactions between them (or institutional governance) curbs terrorism.  
 With regard to the magnitude of governance estimates on terrorism dynamics, we have 
consistently established in initial regressions that the negative magnitude on domestic 
terrorism is higher compared to transnational terrorism5. The difference in magnitude is 
expected because domestic governance policies are intended for the most part to prevent 
citizens from resorting to violent means of voicing their grievances, by providing viable and 
legitimate mechanisms through which their hopelessness and desperations can be 
communicated. Conversely, transnational terrorism which is more likely to result from cross-
country differences in governance structures cannot be mitigated by the same degree as 
domestic terrorism because good governance externalities benefit domestic citizens for the 
most part. Hence, because of non-interference (national sovereignty and territorial integrity), 
domestic policies in one country may not substantially affect citizens in other countries. It 
follows that, peaceful mechanisms of dispute resolution adopted by one country enjoying 
good governance may not necessarily be transferred to neighboring countries. Therefore, 
cross-country differences in governance may still provide opportunities of violence.  
 There has been an inappropriate use of governance terms in the literature because 
these terms have been employed without empirical validity to substantiate their usage. For 
instance, it is inappropriate to employ “general governance” unless the corresponding 
estimate from which it is inferred consists of a plethora of governance indicators. For 
instance, taking the concept of political governance as an example, there are many countries 
(e.g. China) that enjoy political stability but have limited voice and accountability. While 
these countries are generally considered to be associated with undemocratic political 
governance, the inference is misguided until it can be established empirically with an 
                                                 
5
 While the discussion of findings is tailored to incorporate both initial/baseline results and robustness check 
estimations, emphasis on “initial regressions” here is because the comparative perspective is not apparent with 
robustness check results. This is essentially because for the most part, the effects on domestic terrorism are not 
significant in robustness check results.  
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indicator of political governance. In the same vein, there are many African countries that 
enjoy political stability because of stable dictatorships, but which lack voice and 
accountability. These cannot also be qualified as poor in terms of political governance unless 
the qualification is substantiated with some empirical analysis using a political governance 
composite indicator. It follows that the third practical contribution of this study to the 
institutional literature is a clarification of governance concepts. Therefore, the bundling and 
unbundling of governance addresses concerns of conceptual conflation in the usage of 
governance indicators in the literature on terrorism.   
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
 
This study has contributed to the literature by assessing government mechanisms in 
the fight against terrorism with particular emphasis on the bundling and unbundling of ten 
governance dynamics. Domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism variables are used 
whereas the adopted governance indicators are: voice & accountability and political stability 
for political governance; regulation quality and government effectiveness for economic 
governance; corruption-control and the rule of law for institutional governance and; general 
governance consisting of political, economic and institutional governances. The bundling 
exercise is achieved by means of principal component analysis. The empirical evidence is 
based on: a panel of 53 African countries for period 1998-2012 and Generalized Method of 
Moments.  
The following findings have been established. First, for the most part, political 
governance and its constituents respectively have negative effects on all terrorism dynamics, 
with the following consistent increasing order of negative magnitude: unclear terrorism, 
transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism and total terrorism. Second, overwhelmingly for 
economic and institutional governances, the governance dynamics and their constituent 
components affect terrorism negatively, with the magnitude on domestic terrorism 
consistently higher than that on transnational terrorism. Some exceptions in initial regressions 
are: (i) unclear terrorism for which economic governance and its constituents are not 
significant and (ii) total terrorism for which the effect of regulation quality is not significant. 
Third, for most specifications, the effect of general governance is consistently negative on 
terrorism variables.  
Whereas the adopted GMM is not the best estimation technique with which to 
establish causality, constraints in degrees of freedom have prevented the study from engaging 
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other models. Accordingly, estimation techniques that directly engage causality (e.g. Granger 
Causality and Vector Error Correction) require basic initial data properties we do not have at 
the moment. For instance, these techniques require that N<T: a condition that is not feasible 
because we have 54 African countries and good governance indicators are only available from 
1996. 
Future inquiries devoted to enriching the extant literature could assess how established 
linkages apply to specific fundamental features of African development such as, religious 
domination, resource-wealth and income levels. Within this suggested framework, 
decomposing the sample into fundamental characteristics of the continent’s development 
would provide more room for policy implications. Moreover, future studies can engage 
natural experiments in countries (e.g. Somalia, Sudan, and Nigeria) with a multiplicity of 
conflicts and hundreds of ethnic groups on the one hand and assess the effect of Libya on the 
proliferation of terrorism on the other hand. Employing interactive regressions to examine 
indirect impacts through mediating mechanisms is also worthwhile.  
It is also important to acknowledge that political stability and terrorism may be jointly 
endogenous. This is essentially because some measurements of political stability may be 
closely associated with causes of terrorism. Moreover, it is important to balance the narrative 
with the fact that political stability (a constituent of political governance) is a key independent 
variable exclusively in the middle columns of Table 2 and Table 6. Therefore, this caveat for 
the most part does not concern the other nine governance indicators. While the use of GMM 
has partly addressed the underlying concern of endogeneity, future research can focus on 
better empirical underpinnings for establishing causality.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurement) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
VA “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality 
of public services, the quality and degree of independence 
from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General 
Governance  
G.gov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Domestic 
terrorism 
Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln)  
 
Ender et al. (2011) 
and 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
 
   
Transnational 
terrorism  
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
   
Uuclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear (in 
Ln) 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
    
Internet   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inclusive 
development    
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index  UNDP 
    
Growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
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Military Expense    Milit Military Expenditure  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Urbanisation Urban Urban Population growth rate (% of annual) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population  Popg Population growth rate (% of annual) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign aid  NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (%  of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness Trade Export plus Import of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial 
Openness  
FDI Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis. UNDP: United Nations 
Development Program. Ln: Natural logarithm.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1998-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.551 0.929 -3.297 1.087 265 
Voice & Accountability  -0.679 0.723 -2.155 1.009 265 
Political Governance  0.0008 1.268 -3.304 2.671 265 
Government Effectiveness  -0.723 0.620 -2.354 0.823 265 
Regulation Quality  -0.695 0.638 -2.630 0.906 265 
Economic Governance  0.009 1.354 -3.951 3.511 265 
Rule of Law -0.706 0.660 -2.595 1.032 265 
Control of Corruption  -0.602 0.577 -1.848 0.971 265 
Institutional Governance 0.003 1.349 -3.490 3.316 265 
General Governance 0.008 2.170 -6.208 5.242 265 
Domestic terrorism  0.401 0.805 0.000 4.781 265 
Transnational terrorism 0.203 0.451 0.000 2.802 265 
Unclear terrorism 0.060 0.193 0.000 1.566 265 
Total terrorism 0.500 0.885 0.000 4.895 265 
Internet penetration  4.766 8.022 0.002 51.174 264 
Inclusive development  0.872 4.210 0.161 45.231 220 
GDP growth  4.706 4.230 -8.149 32.265 259 
Inflation   10.012 25.435 -6.934 275.983 242 
Military Expenditure  2.245 2.899 0.151 35.846 231 
Urbanisation  3.551 1.556 -0.287 12.984 265 
Population  2.283 0.949 -0.220 8.382 265 
Foreign aid  10.463 11.425 0.017 95.445 259   
Trade Openness  77.976 35.648 24.528 230.414 252 
Financial Openness  5.354 8.880 -1.846 96.149 259 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: First correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 197) 
                    
Political governance  Economic governance  Institutional governance   Control variables  Terrorism variables   
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov Internet IHDI GDPg Inflation Milit Domter Tranter Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.629 0.901 0.637 0.623 0.652 0.683 0.770 0.747 0.802 0.236 0.029 -0.033 -0.238 -0.260 -0.535 -0.530 -0.365 -0.596 PS 
 1.000 0.903 0.708 0.743 0.749 0.704 0.747 0.747 0.840 0.200 0.204 0.007 -0.136 -0.334 -0.238 -0.266 -0.111 -0.277 VA 
  1.000 0.745 0.745 0.776 0.768 0.840 0.828 0.910 0.242 0.129 -0.014 -0.207 -0.329 -0.428 -0.440 -0.263 -0483 Polgov 
   1.000 0.870 0.970 0.882 0.903 0.919 0.935 0.384 0.237 0.014 -0.190 -0.156 -0.187 -0.245 -0.121 -0.224 GE 
    1.000 0.964 0.790 0.854 0.846 0.908 0.289 0.210 -0.045 -0.245 -0.216 -0.156 -0.216 -0.084 -0.194 RQ 
     1.000 0.867 0.910 0.915 0.953 0.350 0.231 -0.014 -0.223 -0.191 -0.178 -0.239 -0.107 -0.217 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.885 0.971 0.923 0.309 0.207 -0.050 -0.177 -0.103 -0.246 -0.312 -0.212 -0.297 CC 
       1.000 0.970 0.962 0.363 0.134 -0.026 -0.205 -0.175 -0.270 -0.299 -0.181 -0.313 RL 
        1.000 0.970 0.346 0.176 -0.040 -0.196 -0.143 -0.266 -0.315 -0.202 -0.314 Instgov 
         1.000 0.334 0.191 -0.024 -0.220 -0.227 -0.299 -0.344 -0.197 -0.348 G.gov 
          1.000 0.018 -0.023 -0.062 -0.087 0.079 0.052 0.129 0.063 Internet 
           1.000 -0.078 -0.016 -0.040 0.090 0.052 -0.031 0.080 IHDI 
            1.000 -0.197 -0.052 0.076 0.157 0.060 0.089 GDPg 
             1.000 -0.128 0.0002 0.030 0.061 0.027 Inflation 
              1.000 0.185 0.107 0.040 0.194 Milit 
               1.000 0.661 0.760 0.973 Domter 
                1.000 0.641 0.785 Tranter 
                 1.000 0.776 Unclter 
                  1.000 Totter 
                    
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: 
Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance. Internet: Internet Penetration. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product Growth. Milit: Military Expenditure. Domter: Domestic Terrorism. 
Tranter: Transnational Terrorism. Unclter: Unclear Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism.   
 
Appendix 4: Second correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 250) 
                    
Political governance  Economic governance  Institutional governance   Control variables  Terrorism variables   
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov Urban Popg NODA Trade FDI Domter Tranter Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.655 0.905 0.626 0.592 0.631 0.659 0.767 0.737 0.798 -0.245 -0.234 -0.100 0.286 -0.062 -0.530 -0.543 -0.374 -0.589 PS 
 1.000 0.913 0.718 0.727 0.749 0.682 0.763 0.747 0.849 -0.086 -0.160 0.057 0.041 -0.070 -0.248 -0.287 -0.141 -0.284 VA 
  1.000 0.740 0.727 0.760 0.737 0.814 0.816 0.906 -0.180 -0.216 -0.021 0.177 -0.073 -0.424 -0.287 -0.141 -0.284 Polgov 
   1.000 0.861 0.965 0.848 0.895 0.901 0.931 -0.219 -0.364 -0.235 0.060 -0.169 -0.150 -0.225 -0.101 -0.184 GE 
    1.000 0.964 0.733 0.835 0.810 0.892 -0.120 -0.231 -0.219 0.014 -0.209 -0.130 -0.206 -0.101 -0.165 RQ 
     1.000 0.820 0.897 0.887 0.945 -0.176 -0.309 -0.235 0.038 -0.196 -0.145 -0.223 -0.105 -0.181 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.871 0.967 0.900 -0.212 -0.324 -0.072 0.124 -0.113 -0.238 -0.305 -0.222 -0.285 CC 
       1.000 0.966 0.963 -0.258 -0.317 -0.168 0.128 -0.156 -0.239 -0.275 -0.172 -0.277 RL 
        1.000 0.963 -0.243 -0.331 -0.140 0.119 -0.140 -0.246 -0.300 -0.204 -0.291 Instgov 
         1.000 -0.214 -0.308 0.358 -0.330 -0.148 -0.281 -0.338 -0.204 -0.327 G.gov 
          1.000 0.768 0.415 -0.295 0.153 0.070 0.060 0.042 0.080 Urban 
           1.000 0.415 -0.295 0.153 -0.004 0.053 -0.014 0.011 Popg 
            1.000 -0.086 0.259 -0.055 -0.057 -0.116 -0.062 NODA 
             1.000 0.407 -0.186 -0.132 -0.109 -0.194 Trade 
              1.000 0.022 0.093 0.058 0.037 FDI 
               1.000 0.674 0.730 0.976 Domter 
                1.000 0.596 0.791 Tranter 
                 1.000 0.755 Unclter 
                  1.000 Totter 
                    
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: 
Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance. Urban; Urbanisation. Popg: Population growth. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Domter: Domestic Terrorism. Tranter: Transnational Terrorism. 
Unclter: Unclear Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism.   
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